

Electricity in Vermont: A Quick Tour of a Few Recurring Issues

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Regulatory Assistance Project

The Regulatory Assistance Project

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Major topics coming up

- 1. Evolution of industry structure in VT
- 2. Roles of the PSB and DPS
- 3. What to Build, What to Buy? Recurring Resource Battles
- 4. Transmission & ISO- New England
- 5. Managing Environmental Impacts
- 6. Rate Design Challenges

Vermont's Power Sector

- Sales: \$800 million
- GMP: 75%
- 14 Munis, 2 Co-ops
- Long history of consolidation
- There were at least 71 power and gas companies in 1912



Vermont power sector: Other important players

- VELCO
- NEPOOL, 1965 blackout New England ISO
- Non-traditional suppliers: Qualifying Facilities (QFs) (aka "PURPA providers");
- PV installers, net metering providers

Vermont power sources 2011

Vermont Own Load Electric Energy Supply, 2011



Vermont Electric Utilities By Energy Source, 2011 (in MWh)



Committed Resources: Vermont Electric Utilities (in MWh)

Source(s): Vermont Electric utilities Integrated Resource Plans (selected), PSD

How to get low rates – inherit hydro or burn coal



PSB – Institutional Aspects

- Origins in legislative attempts to regulate railroads, then Railroad Commission
- "Public good" mandate across various regulated utilities (energy, water, telco, other)
- Quasi-judicial body, 3 Members with 6-year terms, screened by the Judicial Nominating Board
- Can open investigations on its own motion
- Can proceed via rulemakings, contested cases, or via informal proceedings (workshops, stakeholder dialogues, etc.)

Department of Public Service-Roles

- Executive Branch Utility Policy
- Statewide Planning
 - And data analysis
- Public Advocacy
 - With staff experts and billback authority
- Consumer Affairs (answering the 800-line)
- State Energy Office (liaison to US DOE)
- Safety

DPS and PSB assumed current structure in 1981 – Why?

Governor Snelling instigated the change. He wanted:

- Accountability for state's positions in regulatory matters, as the state's top elected official
 - Rather than a special council attorney making the decisions on how to represent the state
- Bring together key utility functions for synergies post Oil Embargo
- PSB would remain independent

Vermont Regulatory Model – compared to other places

- Independence Connecticut, China
- Elected commissioners several states
- Consumer advocate inside the PUC CA
- Backwards on <u>ex parte</u> California
- Lack of authority most of Europe
- Need for interstate regulator EU v. US

What to build, What to buy?

"We've been asking the question: 'Given this price forecast, what should we invest in?' The real question is, 'Given that we *don't know* what prices are, what should we invest in?"

> --Lee Raymond, CEO Exxon-Mobil (*WSJ* 4-8-05)



Evolution of the Vermont power mix

- Early days hydro and Village systems
- Fossil fuels critical for growth (Moran)
- Nuclear arrives
- Canadian hydropower
- Energy Efficiency and Renewables
- Natural Gas
- "Resource of the Decade"

Energy Mix Highlights over Time

Early days of power in Vermont

– Hydroelectric in communities

Fossil fuel combustion critical to extend power further

- NY hydro



Nuclear and Canadian Hydro

Nuclear arrives in the 60s with Yankee Rowe

- And becomes dominant in the 70s with Vermont Yankee
 - Helped Vermont ride through price spikes from oil embargoes of the 70s

Canadian Hydroelectric arrives in the 1970s

- Long connection with northern tier
- Matches VY for dominance with state's Hydro-Quebec contract starting in 1985

Evolution of IRP and Efficiency in VT

- 1970s, '80s:
 - Rising fuel prices (NE had significant oil-fired capacity)
 - Nuclear cost over-runs
 - Dissatisfaction with ex post prudence reviews
 - Flawed utility planning and poor risk management
 - Growing recognition of EE as a resource
- Mid-1980s:
 - Imminent need for new power resources
 - Recognition that §248 did not require a full IRP analysis of proposed investments/contracts

IRP and EE as a Resource

- Docket 5270 opened 2/88; Order issued 4/90
 - Required all utilities to engage in IRP and to implement programs to acquire all cost-effective EE resources, as identified by the IRP
 - IRPs to be reviewed and approved by PSB
 - Prescribed ratemaking treatment for adverse financial impacts on utilities from EE
 - Potential rewards for superior performance
- Early to mid-1990s
 - Utility EE performance varied

IRP and EE in Industry Restructuring

- 1995-96: Restructuring debate
 - Docket 5854: Report to Legislature
 - Who should deliver EE in a restructured industry?
 - PSB concluded 3rd-party "energy efficiency utility"
 - Not government: political and budgetary entanglements
 - Not distribution utilities, given performance to date and the large number of small companies
 - 3rd party EEU: State-wide single purpose entity

Efficiency Vermont

- 1997-1999: Docket 5980
 - $-2^{1/2}$ -year investigation
 - Board order establishment of EVT in 9/99
- 2000: EVT established
 - Performance-based contract, since morphed into performance-based franchise

Renewables, IPPs

- McNeil wood-chip generation
- PURPA and the independent power producers
 - Creative approaches by PSB and DPS
- Some utility hydro (Bolton Falls)
- Net metering
- Searsburg notable utility-built wind project
- Hydro-Québec
- Modern wind systems

Natural Gas for Electricity

--Significant supplier of electric energy in New England

- Roughly 40% of electricity in New England is generated by natural gas
- Even though Vermont gets little electricity from these sources, natural gas remains an important backbone for the grid in which Vermont sits

The sweep of history

- Things change -- "resource of the decade"
- A Hydro and Fossil based power sector evolves to one dominated by natural gas regionally
- With nuclear power still important
- While wind and solar are growing exponentially, but remain a small fraction
- Economies of scale drove bigger plants for decades; this is now turning around
- And energy efficiency is lowering costs and minimizing supply risk

NYPA Power

Importance, we fought for it, we lost

- NYPA power is sold at cost, not at market price
 - Why? Sources are federal projects commissioned by Congress with guidance on allocation
 - Cost is very low today
 - Genesis of VELCO
- NY municipals found legal argument to take over the power Vermont had received for almost 30 years
- Today small amount of NYPA power goes only to Vt munis/coops

Searsburg

- First significant utility owned wind generation in the US in recent years
- Result of 14 years of project development effort
- Good experiment in how to "do" wind

Net Metering

- Vermont among early adopters
- Simple for consumers to use
- Industry developed promptly
 - Exponential growth, energy fraction still small
- Innovation to include farms, and groups
- Utilities learning to plan for customer generation

Connecticut River Hydro Redux

- As part of electric policy choices in Massachusetts, the owner of the Connecticut River dams put them up for sale
- They were bought by a Canadian company
- Vermont could have competed for these assets

Feed-in Tariff

- PURPA QFs were Vermont first experiment with setting a price and offering a long-term commitment to encourage renewables
- Vermont rebooted the idea by creating technology-specific contract prices for qualifying renewable forms (solar, wind, wood, etc.)

- Greater than avoided cost?

• Room for improvement to introduce market oriented features to the feed-in tariff

Modern Wind Projects

- On Vermont scale, these provide significant energy
- Ridgelines allocated to wind is controversial
- Renewable energy credits valuable in southern New England (deliverability important)
- SPEED program also a factor
 - SPEED is an economic development initiative
 - VT utilities sell the attributes and can no longer claim them
 - Proceeds benefit ratepayers

Regional Natural Gas Dependency

- 40% of New England electricity produced by natural gas generation alarm?
- Price volatility
- Reliability rules allow gas generators to claim capacity credit in the capacity market without firm gas supply or firm back up fuel

– Result: "Gas versus Gas" competition = when there is a cold snap, primary heating demand spikes, not enough gas for all the gas generators, some generators suddenly unavailable when needed most

ISO-New England: Paying for Reliability

- How does the region support reliability?
- Companies own supply resources
- Transmission links can improve reliability
- Demand side also supports reliability

ISO-New England: Paying for Reliability

- What if the right answer to a reliability problem is an incremental dose of EE, DR, DG?
- FERC will not order ISO-NE to pay for the nontransmission solution(s)
 - Practice calls for cost of transmission solutions (not others) to be shared across all New England
- As a result, the region pays more for the line
- As this happens over and over, cost-effective solutions are bypassed for more costly and intrusive solutions

ISO-New England: Paying for Reliability

- Vermont policy on this is clear
- ISO-NE practice should be changed
- All substitutes should be eligible for ISO-NE tariff support, best set wins
- VELCO argues for this in ISO-NE governance
- More states would need to see how this raises costs for all and can be changed with consensus among states, which is lacking now

History Lessons – Recurring Resource Battles

- Hydro and public power battles since the 1920s
- Churchill Falls vs. Vermont Yankee
- Seabrook, Millstone, and the era of nuclear cost overruns
- NYPA and the DPS role in power sales
- Hydro Quebec, HVDC line, and utility contracts

History Lessons (2) Challenges of today's resource choices

- Searsburg and utility-scale wind
- PV and net metering
- Diversity as an issue the challenge of too much gas-fired power
- ISO New England's transmission expansion process; socializing reliability

Managing Environmental Impacts

- Siting: what is the relationship between Act 250 and Section 248?
- Side visit: no jurisdiction over interstate pipelines; (Champlain Pipeline)
- Application of environmental criteria to purchases as well (Hydro Quebec)
- "Light touch" review for small renewable projects
- Climate change [comes later]

Rate Design

- Vermont's commitment to cost-based rates
 - Application of the general principle that the cost-causer should pay
 - Cost allocation among customer classes is fair, with no subsidies
- Seasonal rates
 - Why we did it, why we are glad we did, and why we removed them
 - Inherent winners and losers; a demonstration of the dilemmas facing decision-makers
- Block rates
 - DPS NYPA power
 - Inclining, declining

Rate Design

- Time-varying rates
- "Public interest" rate proposals
 - Economic development rates (new jobs vs. existing jobs)
 - Schools and hospitals
 - Low-income households
- Surcharges
- Fuel-adjustment clauses: why not and why



Source: Faruqui, et al. (2012). Time-Varying and Dynamic Rate Design. Montpelier, VT: RAP.

Major topics remaining

- Climate change and the power sector –
 (1) RGGI and carbon revenue recycling
- 2. Climate change and the power sector –
 (2) Integrating renewables and the role of Demand Response
- 3. Reprise some leading legislative actions in Vermont



Climate Change and the Power Sector – (1) The logic of carbon revenue recycling Daily Climate News -





Carbon prices/taxes alone will deliver only a part of the abatement needed



for a changing world

Where do power sector reductions actually come from?

4 main possibilities:

- Reduce **consumption**
- **Re-dispatch** the existing fleet and/or
- **Shut down** high-carbon units
- Lower the emission profile of **new generation** (including repowering)

For each opportunity, ask:

- 1. How many tons will it avoid?
- 2. How much will it cost society (*or*, *cost consumers per ton*)?
- 3. What tools including what kind of carbon caps -- get the best results on #1 & #2 ?

Challenge#1: It's hard to affect demand (enough) with carbon prices alone

- To decarbonise power while adding electric transport, BAU demand must be reduced by about 40% by 2050
- Demand for electricity is relatively *inelastic*
- Long-term price-elasticity of demand is about -0,2 to -0,3. (A +10% increase in price yields a 2% to 3% decrease in demand)
- BUT: the *income-elasticity of demand* is positive (as incomes rise, so does demand)
- What price increase would be needed to turn load growth negative in a Europe with rising incomes and modern economies?

Challenge #2: Carbon prices to generators can increase wholesale power prices with little effect on dispatch or emissions



Carbon price Can Raise Prices without Changing Dispatch or Emissions

- Dispatch depends on 'gas Vs coal' price <u>&</u> CO2 €



"High cost tons" in the US context

Study by PJM – the largest wholesale power market in the US

	Carbon @ \$20	Carbon @ \$40	Carbon @ \$60
Power price increase per MWh	\$15/MWh	\$30/MWh	\$45/MWh
Total consumer cost increase	\$12 billion Per year	\$24 billion per year	\$36 billion per year
Number of tonnes reduced via redispatch	14 MT		
Consumer cost per tonne reduced	\$850 /tonne	\$348/tonne	\$1440/tonne
Multiple of carbon price	>40 times	>8 times	

"High cost tonnes" in EU power markets

Scenario	Carbon price 20 Euros	Carbon price 40 Euros
Event/Result	No demand response	Price-elasticity2
(a) Power price increase	€ 10.9 /MWh	€ 23.2 /MHz
(b) Total sales	3016 TWh	2881 TWh
(c) Total Cost increase	€ 33 Billion	€ 66.8 Billion
(d) Emission reduction	133 Mt	363 Mt
	(all due to redispatch)	(165 Mt from dispatch,
		198 Mt from demand response)
(e) Consumer cost per tonne reduced	€ 248 per tonne	€ 184 per tonne

Source: Sijm, et al, The Impact of the EU ETS on Electricity Prices, Final Report to DG Environment, December 2008 (ECN-E-08-007) [Row (e) is a RAP calculation based on Tables in the report, as shown.]

Efficiency Programmes Save 9x More Carbon Per Consumer GBP Than Carbon Taxes Or Prices



Cumulative CO, Emissions Saved by: Increasing Rates 3%; and

Energy solutions for a changing world

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Carbon Revenue Recycling: Carbon revenues are a powerful tool to leverage carbon price

- Key idea: Sell allowances, invest carbon revenue in lowcost carbon reduction -- especially EE
- Northeast US: 9 RGGI states now dedicate >80% of allowance value to clean energy (~55% to EE)
- Even with low (~\$3/ton) CO2 prices, RGGI has raised over \$500 Million for EE programs – avoiding CO2 at a cost of (minus) \$-73 per ton !
- So far: Adding \$1.6 Billion to the regional economy, and supporting 16,000 new jobs
- Political lesson: RGGI renewed 2013, cap lowered
- Germany, France, Czech Republic have programs and/or plans to invest substantial carbon revenues in EE



Climate change and the power sector (2): Integrating renewables

The Challenge of Renewables' Variability



Net demand = gross demand minus demand effectively served by lowmarginal-cost, variable RES supply. <Southern UK 2030 w 28% PV & wind>

Traditional DR: Peak Shaving



Source: www.ijenko.com

Challenge #3: Variable Renewable Power --Net demand is more volatile than overall demand, and lacks a repeatable daily pattern.



"If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it" -- Dwight Eisenhower





Low-Tech Storage: Water Heaters Can Provide Rapid Response Frequency Regulation

PJM pilot water heater -- January 14, 2011; Midnight to 3:00 a.m.



Demand Response via Thermal Storage

Electric resistance water heater demonstrates lowcost water heating using day-ahead LMP while responding to the PJM frequency regulation signal.



Operational Details •105 gallon, dual element electric resistance •"Power" 4.5 kW, Energy 26 kWh

STEFFES Marathon 4 pjm

Finale: Recent Legislative Milestones

- Balance between legislative policy-making and inappropriate detailed interventions
- Some leading modern examples:
 - Least-cost utility planning
 - All-fuels charge and weatherization
 - Decision not to adopt retail competition
 - Creation of the Efficiency Utility
 - SPEED and Net Metering
 - Alternative regulation
 - RGGI and "carbon revenue recycling"

U.S. Utility EE Program Spending Now Over \$7 Billion/Year and Still Growing



Note: 1993 - 2008 represents spending; 2009 represents spending among CEE members reporting to CEE; 2010 and 2011 represent budgets of CEE members reporting to CEE; 2015 and 2020 represent LBNL "high case" projections

Sources: ACEEE, The 2010 State Energy Efficiency Scorecard, October 2010; CEE, State of the Efficiency Program Industry, December 10, 2010, and March 14, 2012; LBNL, The Shifting Landscape of Ratepayer-Funded Energy Efficiency in the U.S., 2009.



Questions?